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JUDICIAL CHOICE AND DISPARITIES 
BETWEEN MEASURES OF ECONOMIC 
VALUES" 
An important idea, which characterizes law in society, is a reluctance to move 
from the status quo. In general, one can argue that legal institutions and legal 
doctrine are not engaged in the redistribution of wealth from one party to 
another. This paper explores a possible explanation for that principle. The 
authors' research suggests that, across a wide range of entitlements and in a 
variety of contexts, individuals value losses more than foregone gains. The 
paper argues, as a matter of efficiency, that law and social policy might have 
developed in a manner consistent with this valuation disparity. Furthermore, 
this valuation disparity can be transformed into conceptions of fairness, and, as 
a matter of fairness, legal decisions might have developed in a manner 
consistent with this fairness norm. In the first part of the paper, the economic 
and psychological research on the valuation disparity is described in detail. 
The paper then examines a series of legal doctrines, all of which can be 
explained by the valuation disparity phenomenon revealed in the experimental 
data. Cohen and Knetsch conclude that the behaviour of legal institutions and 
actors can be explained by thevaluation disparity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The idea that the legal system should not move wealth from one 
person to another pervades common law doctrine and reasoning. As 
Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, "The general principle of our law is that 
loss from accident must lie where it falls."l Common explanations of 
that position focus on the political power and class bias of those who 
make legal decisions and create legal rules. 
We propose an alternative interpretation of the historical truism 
that "losses should lie where they fall." People value actual losses far 
more than foregone gains, and thus, it is a matter of efficiency: as well 
as of fairness, to adopt presumptive legal rules which do not direct non- 
consensual transfers of wealth. We explore the extent to which such 
disparities in valuations between gains and losses have been 
incorporated in legal doctrines and principles. 
The following two puzzles illustrate the issue. They represent 
examples of apparent irrationality in law, which we believe are perfectly 
understandable in terms of common behaviour and are probably 
desirable. 
Puzzle I: A seller sells an automobile to a buyer (Bl), permitting 
B1 to take possession of the car before payment in full.3 The seller 
The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881) at 94. As we point out later, it is not as 
simple as it might first appear to know where losses lie, in order to decide where they should fall. As 
well, it is clear to us that the idea to which Holmes is alluding has application far beyond accidents, 
and may inform our understanding of property rights, contract remedies, and regulatory policy. 
The definition of efficiency that we employ in this paper is quite simple. A legal decision or 
rule is efficient if, after its application, at least one person is better off and no one is worse off than 
before. We might adopt a Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency, which permits hypothetical 
compensatory wealth transfers between the affected parties; whether we choose a Pareto or such a 
potential Pareto superiority criterion does not matter to our thesis. 
This puzzle is equally apparent in the treatment of sales by sellers who remain in possession 
of goods. Here, sales legislation, which deals with sales by sellers in possession, generally 
expropriates the interest of the fist  buyer only where the second buyer has received deJirqe/y of the 
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reserves ownership of the car until full payment. Before full payment, B1 
enters into an agreement with a sub-buyer (B2) who pays B1 a down 
payment of $500 for the car, with delivery arranged for the following 
day. Before delivery to the sub-buyer, the original seller discovers the 
sub-sale. In a dispute between the original seller claiming ownership of 
the car and B2, who also claims ownership, the original seller will win.4 
A seller sells an automobile to a buyer (Bl), permitting B1 to 
take possession of the car before payment in full. The seller reserves 
ownership of the car until full payment. Before full payment, B1 enters 
into an agreement with a sub-buyer (B2) who pays B1 a down payment of 
$500 for the car, with immediate delivery arranged from B1 to B2. After 
delivery to the sub-buyer, the original seller discovers the sub-sale. In a 
dispute between the original seller claiming ownership of the car and B2, 
who in this case has taken delivery of the car and who also claims 
ownership, the sub-buyer wins!S 
Puzzle 11: A seller contracts with a buyer to purchase a piece of, 
jewellery. The buyer pays $100 as a deposit and agrees to pay $200 per 
month for twelve months to pay off the purchase price of $2,500. The 
buyer also agrees that, on default, the seller will be able to retain any 
money that has been paid as of the date of default. The buyer defaults 
after six months. The seller repossesses the jewellery and retains the 
$1,300, which has been paid. If the buyer seeks to set aside the forfeiture 
clause and recover the amount paid, then the buyer will only be able to 
property. 
The original seller wins because at common law the first buyer could not transfer any better 
title than she or he had. Thus, the first sub-buyer could not receive any better ownership claim than 
the person selling to this sub-buyer, and would lose to the original owner. See Cole v. North Western 
Bank (1875), LR. 10 C.P. 354 at 362, [1874-801 All E.R. Rep. 486,44 L.J.C.P. 233. See generally, 
M.D. Chalmers, The Sale of GoodsAcf, 1889 (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1905) at 57-66. 
The outcome is produced through the operation of section 25(2) of the original English Sale 
of Goods Act (U.K.), 1893, c. 71, which re-enacted with some slight modifications section 9 of the 
FactorsAct (U.K.), 1889, c. 45 [hereinafter Factors Act], However, that section only operates where 
the sub-buyer obtains delivery of tftegoods or transfer of docunzents of title, and thus does not protect 
mere contract or ownership expectations. 
\Ve should also point out that this example suggests that Holmes's insight is equally accurate of 
legislative action, at least where the legislative institution is purporting to create a framework for 
contract and ownership disputes analogous to the framework established at common law. 
Finally, some insight into the reasons we protect the sub-buyer who has possession of the 
goods may be gained from early decisions, which refused to extend the equivalent section of the 
Factors Act, to lessees, even where the lessee had entered into a lease-option arrangement. See 
Helby v. Mattfiews, [I8951 kc. 471,64 L.J.Q.B. 465,60 J.P. 20 (H.L.). 
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do so if it would be "unconscionable for the seller to retain the money."6 
In the vast majority of cases, the courts will leave the money with the 
seller. 
A seller contracts with a buyer for the purchase of a piece of 
jewellery. The buyer pays nothing down and agrees to pay $200 per 
month for twelve months to pay off the purchase price of $2,400. The 
buyer agrees to pay $1,300 on default to the seller as liquidated damages. 
The buyer defaults, and the seller repossesses the jewellery and sues to 
recover the $1,300 as liquidated damages. The liquidated damages 
clause will, however, be held unenforceable where the buyer persuades 
the court that the clause was intended as apenalty. In a large percentage 
of the cases, the courts will refuse to enforce the clause and leave the 
money with the buyer.7 
The puzzle in these examples is that the outcome differs 
depending on the location of the object of the dispute. In Puzzle I, the 
issue of which claimant's ownership interest is expropriated depends on 
whether the sub-buyer has or has not taken delivery of the car. In Puzzle 
11, the issue of the enforceability of the private damage assessment term 
depends on whether the money has or has not been transferred to the 
seller. 
Many writers have seen the similarity between the penalty and 
forfeiture cases and have argued forcefully for solutions, which would 
reconcil8 the two doctrines, or which would eliminate the "illogical 
distinction drawn by the existing law between penalty clauses and the 
See Stockloser v. Johnson, [I9541 1 Q.B. 476 at 492, [I9541 2 W.L.R. 439, [I9541 1 All E.R. 
630. While there is no empirical data on this point, our impression, and the impression of most 
commentators, is that judicial discretion to take wealth away from the seller, and thus return monies 
to the buyer, is only very rarely exercised, compared to judicial willingness to reviewpenalty clauses. 
See S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracfs, 2d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1984) at 341-45. 
The distinction between the treatment of liquidated damages or penalties and forfeiture 
clauses becomes even more problematic where the defendant has promised to pay a deposit, which 
is subject to forfeiture on breach, and then fails to pay it. The cases are split on this third situation. 
Some hold that the buyer must pay, which treats the arrangement as a forfeiture. Others hold that 
the arrangement represents a penalty clause in which case, as above, the buyer does not have to pay. 
See Hinton v. Sparkes (1868), L.R. 3 C.P. 161,37 W.C.P. 81,17 L.T. 600 (buyer liable for 
amount, even though penal); Dewar v. Mintoff, [I9121 2 KB. 373, 81 L.J.K.B. 885, 106 L.T. 763 
(amount not recoverable by seller as a penalty). See S.M. Waddams, 77te Law of Damages 
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1991) at para. 8.310. 
See Waddams, ibid. 
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doctrine of forfeitureTg It does not matter, of course, whether the 
proponents of reform would prefer the penaltylliquidated damages 
solution over the forfeiture clause solutionlo or the converse. The point 
is that rationality, to some reformers, means that the situations should be 
treated the same way. 
While the legal treatment of these cases appears anomalous, the 
results reflect real and important differences in valuations of losses 
relative to gains and in their judgments of fairness predicated on this 
disparity. The differences in valuations of gains and losses appear to go 
a long way towards explaining the rationality of the apparently illogical 
puzzles presented above, and of many others as well.11 These puzzles 
can be explained as manifestations of the idea thatpossession12 losses are 
much more important than foregone gains, and the law takes such real 
differences into account. In each case the legal rule treats economic 
gains and losses differently, even though nominally commensurate. 
These doctrines reflect powerful human sentiments: 
bare expectations were less important than expectations allied to present rights, 
especially rights of property. Hume and Adam Smith, for example, both said that 
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Sale of Goods (Toronto: Minister of the 
Attorney General, 1979) at 425. Law Commission, PenaNy Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid 
(Working Paper No. 61) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975) at 51-54. 
lo The Law Commission of England would prefer that both be treated like penalty clauses, 
while Waddams would prefer that both be treated like forfeiture clauses. See Law Commission, 
ibid ; and Waddams, supra note 7. 
I1 Common law judges seemingly apply Aristotelian concepts of corrective justice by restoring 
parties to the position they were in prior to the wrongful act. Law as it has developed in most 
common law jurisdictions implicates ideas of corrective, rather than distributive justice. Corrective 
justice is a system for preserving what we have and for minimizing disruptions of feelings of loss, not 
for bringing about new distributions of wealth. 
Maintaining entitlements is implicit in law in three ways. First, compensation will usually be 
considered in terms of remedying actual losses to plaintiffs rather than in compensating foregone 
gains. Second, and more important, law will represent itself as a passive, political institution, 
demanding justification for transfers of wealth from defendants to plaintiffs. Finally, judicial 
discretion implicit in fact-finding, interpretation rule selection, and rule application may incorporate 
concepts of fairness, which reflect the idea that losses are much more important than foregone 
gains. 
l2 While we use the word possession to denote the critical element in these cases as well as in 
the empirical studies, which we describe, we are not suggesting that a physical connection or even 
legal entitlement is a prerequisite to the occurrence of the phenomenon. The reference position 
from which changes are perceived as gains or losses may well depend on factors other than physical 
possession. 
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expectations arising out of rights of property desented greater protection than 
expectations to something which had never been possessed. To deprive somebody of 
something which he merely expects to receive is a less serious wrong, deserving of less 
protection, than to deprive somebody of the expectationof continuing to hold something 
which he a l readypo~es~es~3 
11. THE VALUATION DISPARITY 
In each of the cases of judicial choices that we explore in this 
paper, greater weight is given to actual out-of-pocket losses than to the 
opportunity cost of foregone gains. Such asymmetries in the valuations 
of gains and losses are not at all consistent with the assurances of most 
economists that valuations of gains and losses are equivalent, or with 
generally accepted principles of analysis based on such assumptions of 
people's preferences. 
There is no dispute that the economic value of both gains and 
losses is measured by what people are willing to sacrifice. That is, gains 
are valued by a payment measure, and losses are valued by a compensa- 
tion measure. For example, Posner suggests, "[Tlhe economic value of 
something is how much someone is willing to pay for it or, if he [or she] 
has it already, how much money he [or she] demands to part with it."14 
Similarly, Michelman suggests, "[Blenefits are measured by the total 
number of dollars which prospective gainers would be willing to pay to 
secure adoption, and losses are measured by the total number of dollars 
which prospective losers would insist on as the price of agreeing to 
adoption."lS 
Although income effects or limits on ability to pay may cause the 
two measures to differ, these are normally not a factor of any practical 
importance and can safely be ignored in most applications. The 
common view is that, "for many goods, services, and amenities that 
command a modest fraction of the consumer's budget, the differences 
between [the] ... measures are trivial."16 Consequently, the usual advice 
I3 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) at 
428 [emphasis added]. 
l4 R. Posner, An EcononticAnaZysisoflaw, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986) at 11. 
F.I. Michelman, "Properly, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of 
'Just Compensation' Law" (1967) 80 Hans L. Rev. 1165 at 1214. 
I6 A. Randall, Resource Economics (New York: Wiley, 1987) at 244. 
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is that "as a practical matter it usually does not make much difference 
which of these two approaches ... is adopted."17 
Common preferences and reactions to actual choices are, 
however, not consistent with the assertion of equivalence between the 
measures of loss and gain. Nor, it seems, are judicial reactions and 
choices. 
The traditional assumption of equivalence between the 
willingness-to-pay and the compensation-demanded measures of value is 
largely an empirical assertion that is common to both economic and 
legal analysis. It  is based on the behavioural assumption that people 
assess gains and losses by comparing how well off they would be with 
more or with less of something-for example, by comparing how they 
would feel with their present wealth with how they would feel with their 
present holdings plus $100; or by comparing their level of welfare with 
an injury and their economic well-being without one. 
New empirical evidence indicates that people evaluate gains and 
losses in terms of changes from some reference position, instead of 
comparing alternative end states. This evidence also indicates that they 
value losses from this neutral point much more than they value gains 
beyond it: "[Tlhe aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of 
money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining 
the same amount."'8 
Virtually all controlled evaluation tests, as well as the 
commonplace reactions of people to real choices, point to large and 
persistent differences between the valuation of losses and foregone gains . 
and do not confirm the traditional assumption that these two measures 
of value are equal. Large differences were first noted in survey studies 
of people's valuations of various losses of environmental assets or the 
degradation of environmental quality. For example, a sample of duck 
hunters said they would be willing to pay an average of $247 to save a 
marsh area used by ducks, but would demand an average of $1044 to 
accept the identical loss.19 Similarly, a survey of anglers yielded a 
l7 S.E. Rhoads, The Economist's Mew of the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985) at 125. 
l8 D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk'' 
(1979) 47 Econometrica 263 at 279. 
l9 J. Hammack & G.M. Brown, waterfowl and Wetlands: Toward Bioecononzic Analysis 
(Washington: Resources for the Future, 1974). 
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payment value of $35 and a compensation value of $100 for the loss of a 
fishing areaFO The disparity between the two measures of value was also 
reported to vary from $43 to $120 for the loss of a fishing pier;21 from 
$22 to $93 for the loss of a local postal service;22 from $21 to $101 for the 
loss of a goose-hunting ~e rmi t ;~3  from $54 to $143 for the loss of an 
opportunity to hunt elk;24 and from $40 to $833 for the loss of the 
chance to hunt deer.25 We are not aware of any surveys reporting 
equivalence between the two measures. 
Later studies based on real exchange experiments have provided 
more stringent tests than the earlier ones, which were based on 
hypothetical survey questions. The results have been essentially the 
same. Even when exchanges of real goods and actual cash payments 
motivated the evaluations, the compensation demanded to give up an 
entitlement far exceeded the comparable payment measures of value. 
For example, people required about four times more money to give up a 
lottery ticket than they would be willing to pay to acquire one26 To hunt 
deer in the northern United States, the values were reported to be $25 
for the acquisition of a permit and $172 for the actual loss of a permit.27 
A more recent series of real exchange experiments has affirmed 
the persistence of the evaluation disparities over repeated valuations, 
and has eliminated the possibility that the differences might be 
attributable to transaction costs or strategic behaviour on the part of 
20 W.F. Sinclair, 771e Economic and Social Impact of Kemano II Hydroeleclric Project on Brilf 11 
Columbia's Fisheries Resources (Vancouver: Fisheries and Marine Service, Department of the 
Environment, 1976). 
21 N.D. Banford, J.L. Knetsch & G.A. Mauser, "Feasibility Judgements and Alternative 
Measures of Benefits and Costs" (1980) 11 J. Bus. Admin. 25. 
22 lbid. 
23 R.C. Bishop & T.A. Heberlein, "Measuring Values of Extra-Market Goods: Are Indirect 
Measures Biased?" (1979) 61 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 926. 
24 D. Brookshire, A. Randall & J. R. Stoll, "Valuing Increments and Decrements in Natural 
Resource Sentice Flows" (1980) 62 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 478. 
25 R.C. Bishop & T.A. Heberlein, "Does Contingent Valuation Work?" in R.G. Cummings, 
D.S. Brookshire & W.D. Schulze, eds., Valuing Environmental Goods (Totowa, N.J.: Roman & 
Allanheld, 1986) 123. 
26 J.L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, "Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demandcd: 
Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value" (1984) 99 Q. J. Econ. 
507. 
27 ~ i s h o ~  & Heberlein, supra note 25. 
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participantsJ8 The results indicate that, consistent with other evidence 
and contrary to conventional assertions, people value losses much more 
than gains. The differences are pervasive and large. They persist over 
repeated valuations and they are not the result of inhibitions posed by 
transaction costs. 
An indication of the general findings is illustrated by the results 
of a simple exercise involving people's actual choices between a coffee 
mug and a large, four-hundred-gram chocolate barJ9 Each member of 
one group of seventy-six participants was given a mug and told to keep it. 
Each was then given a chance to give up the mug to obtain a chocolate 
bar. A second group of eighty-seven participants was given the opposite 
choice: to give up chocolate bars to obtain coffee mugs. 
Traditional economics predicts that, in the absence of any 
significant transaction costs, about the same proportion of participants 
in each of the groups will prefer mugs to chocolate bars and will choose 
accordingly. The actual results were in sharp contrast to this prediction: 
89 per cent indicated a preference for the mug when initially given a . 
mug, and only 10 per cent revealed a similar preference for mugs when 
they had to give up a chocolate bar to obtain one. The relative value of 
mugs and chocolate bars varied greatly and depended on whether the 
evaluation was made in terms of a gain or a loss. The mug was valued 
more when it had to be given up to obtain a chocolate bar, and was 
valued less when the chocolate bar had to be given up to obtain a mug. 
The influence of income constraints and wealth or income effects was 
entirely eliminated in the exercise, leaving the choices dependent on 
individual preferences. These choices showed that gains and losses were 
valued very differently. 
A further test for the equivalence or non-equivalence of 
valuations of gains and losses was modeled on the Coase Theorem, a 
mainstay of the economic analysis of law and the basis for many legal 
policy prescriptions. A major conclusion of the Coase proposition is 
that, in the absence of transaction costs and wealth effects, people are 
presumed to make mutually advantageous exchanges to ensure that 
28 D. Kahneman, J.L Knetsch & R.H. Thaler, "Experimental Test of the Endowment Effect 
and the Coase Theorem" (1990) 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325. 
29 J.L. Knetsch, "The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Non-Reversible Indifference 
Curves" (1989) 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 1277. 
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resources are put to their most valued ~ s e . 3 ~  "Since a receipt foregone 
of a given amount is the equivalent of a payment of the same amount,'y31 
final allocations of entitlements are assumed to be independent of initial 
entitlements. "[Tlhe ultimate result (which maximizes the value of 
production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is 
assumed to work without 
The Coase Theorem test was conducted by randomly giving one 
member of each of a large number of paired participants a good, a large 
chocolate bar. Those participants were told it was theirs to take home or 
to sell, if the person with whom they were paired made a sufficiently 
attractive offer. The experiment was deliberately arranged so that the 
potential buyers had been given a larger windfall sum of money than the 
sellers. Despite this effort to encourage buyers to use their 
unanticipated gain to make larger offers to acquire the goods, few 
transactions were concludedP3 In spite of the entitlements' random 
distribution, the people holding them demanded much more to give 
them up than potential buyers were willing to pay to acquire them. The 
valuations were not, contrary to the Coase prediction, independent of 
the initial assignments of entitlements.J4 
Individuals have now repeatedly been shown to exhibit 
disparities between gain and loss valuations in experimental settings, as 
reported by many investigators using a variety of methods to evaluate 
widely varied assets. As well, people's actual behaviour in making 
everyday choices increasingly has been observed to be consistent with 
these findings. For example, the valuation disparity and consequent 
reluctance to sell at a loss is observed in the greater volume of house 
sales when prices are rising, over the number when they are falling. This 
can also be observed in the smaller volume of sales of securities that 
have declined in price relative to those for which prices have increased.35 
- - 
30 R.H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) 3 J. L. & Econ. 1. 
31 Bid. at 7. 
32 lbid. at 8. 
33 Supra note 28. 
34 The major efficiency implications of the valuations of gains and losses have been 
demonstrated in H. Hovenkamp, "Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect" (1991) 20 J. Legal Stud. 
225 at 230. 
35 H. Shefrin & M. Statman, "The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers 
Too Long: Theory and Evidence" (1985) 40 J. Fin. 777. 
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Firms frequently are reluctant to divest themselves of plants and product 
lines even though they would not consider buying these same assets, and 
stock prices often rise when they do give them up. 
A further illustration of the differing valuations of gains and 
losses is provided by responses to recent automobile insurance 
legislation in two American states. In both jurisdictions people are given 
a choice between cheaper policies, which limit rights to subsequent 
recovery of further damages, and a more expensive policy permitting 
such actions. Importantly, the default option differs: the reduced rights 
policy is offered in New Jersey unless it is given up; and full rights policy 
is given in Pennsylvania unless the less expensive option is specified. 
Given the minimal costs in both states of choosing either option and the 
large amounts of money at issue, the results have been dramatic. At last 
count over 70 per cent of New Jersey automobile owners have adopted 
the reduced rights policy, but fewer than 25 per cent of Pennsylvanians 
have done so? 
The differing weights attached to gains and losses have also been 
found to influence the judgment of what people regard as acceptable or 
unfair behaviour in economic relationships. If an action is seen to 
impose a loss on one party for the benefit of another, this will nearly 
always be widely seen to be unfair-quite apart from whatever economic 
justification might exist. For example, raising prices in response to 
sudden shifts in demand is seen to benefit the seller, who has not 
incurred any cost increase, at the expense of the buyer and is, therefore, 
judged to be unfair. Similarly, cutting wages when unemployment 
increases is thought to be unfair by the vast majority of people because 
the employer benefits in direct proportion to the worker's loss. As a less 
aversive relinquishment of a gain, the reduction of a customary bonus 
payment to workers is apparently viewed as more acceptable than an 
equivalent reduction in wages, which is commonly seen as imposing a 
loss on workers.J7 
Raising rents of a new, as opposed to a sitting, tenant or cutting 
wages of a new, rather than an old, employee is generally considered to 
be fair because the benefit to the landlord or the employer is not seen to 
36 J. Meszarose el al. , Framing, Loss Aversion and Insurance Decisions (Working Paper) 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991). 
37 D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetsch & R.H. Thaler, "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: 
Entitlements in the Market" (1986) 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 728. 
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be gained at the expense of a loss to the other party. The evidence also 
suggests a willingness of most people to back up their judgments with 
sacrifices to punish unfair behaviour and reward what they take to be 
fair dealings.38 A major motivation for these judgments appears to be 
that losses matter more to people than do foregone gains. 
This strong intuition to value losses more than commensurate 
gains, and the implications for the resolution of competing claims, was 
summarized earlier by Holmes in the following terms: 
It is in the nature of man's mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own 
for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be 
torn away without yourresenting the act and trying to defendyourself, however ou came 
by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man. 33 
While there has been very little empirical work investigating this 
phenomenon among legal actors, Stewart Macaulay's seminal work in 
the sociology of law almost three decades ago offers some support for 
the appearance of this phenomenon among members of at least one 
business community when they confront legal disputes.40 Macaulay 
interviewed sixty-eight business people and lawyers representing forty- 
eight companies and six law firms. All but two of the companies were 
engaged in manufacturing, with plants in Wisconsin. In his investigation 
of dispute settlements, Macaulay began with the formal assumption that, 
on breach of contract, the breaching party, the buyer, for example, would 
be legally obligated to pay all of the seller's wasted expenses up to the 
time of breach, plus anticipated lost profits. However, the responses of 
the purchasing agents and sales personnel revealed attitudes consistent 
with the experimental data discussed above. That is, they uniformly 
believed that all they ought to recover or to pay in damages was an 
amount representing the seller's actual expenses: 
38 D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetsch & R.H. Thaler, "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics" 
(1986) 59 J. Bus. 285. 
39 O.W. Holmes, "The Path of Law" (1897) 10 Haw. L. Rev. 457 at 477. The only difference 
revealed by the empirical evidence is that the reluctance to give up something does not necessarily 
only occur after "a long time," but may well set in immediately. Once a reference position is 
perceived, which leads to a change being viewed as a loss, then the valuation will respond 
accordingly. See, particularly, supra note 28. 
40 See "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study" (1963) 28 Am. Soc. 
Rev. 55. 
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[A111 ten of the purchasing agents [that were] asked about cancellation of orders once 
placed indicated that they expected to be able to cancel orders freely subject to only an 
obligation to pay for the seller's major expenses such as scrapped steel. All seventeen 
sales personnel asked reported that they often had to accept cancellation. One said "You 
can't ask a man to eat paper [the firm's product] when he has no use f ~ r i t . " ~ l  
The  empirical findings discussed earlier, together with 
Macaulay's evidence, suggest that people value gains and losses from 
some neutral reference point or level. Losses from this reference are 
commonly weighed more than gains beyond it. The reference position, 
therefore, determines whether an adverse change is regarded as a loss or 
as a foregone gain, and whether a positive change is treated as a gain or 
as a reduction of a loss. Given the large disparities between valuations, 
these differences can have significant practical impact. 
111. THE DISPARITY AND JUDICIAL CHOICE 
The legitimacy of the common law has largely been based on its 
decentralized, ad hoc, incremental development by judges who have 
little enforcement power, and who therefore respond to an intuitive, non- 
empirical interpretation of community mores and individual preferences. 
If such interpretations underlie individual judgments, then a 
phenomenon as pervasive as the valuation disparity would be expected 
to be implicated, either explicitly or implicitly, in the development of 
legal doctrine. Indeed, as expected, the idea that losses count more than 
expected gains is encountered in an enormous range of ideas in law.42 
An important way in which the valuation disparity has been 
incorporated in law is through the widespread recognition of possession 
as a foundation for the declaration or recognition of legal entitlementsP3 
42 Other, independent, ad hoc explanations can be offered for many specific results, but the 
valuation disparity alone appears uniquely robust as a consistent explanation across a wide range of 
apparently independent legal issues. 
43 One of the most articulate writers on the relationship of possession and the human 
condition is C.B. MacPherson who, in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962) at 3, wrote that "[tlhe human essence is freedom from dependence on the 
wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession." See also British Columbia Law Reform 
Commission, Wrongful Interference with Goods (Working Paper No. 67) (Vancouver: British 
Columbia Law Reform Commission, 1992) at 21. 
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The often misused expression that "possession is nine-tenths of the 
law"44 is a manifestation of judicial intuition that possession of things is 
intimately connected to establishing the endowment effect, and 
underlies judicial choices favouring protection against losses over 
foregone gains. 
Both legal writers and the designers of the empirical studies 
discussed earlier have used the term possession in extremely ambiguous 
ways. But regardless of one's choice of definition, it is incontrovertible 
that judicial sensitivity to the notion of possession, or seisin, in English 
law is deeply rooted and utterly pervasive: "In the history of our law 
there is no idea more cardinal than that of seisin."45 
Frederick P0llock,4~ while noting that it was difficult to obtain a 
consistent doctrine or consistent termin~logy:'~ offered several theories 
on why judge-made common law presumes in favour of posse~sion.~~ 
Utilitarian justifications for the protection of possession range from a 
concern with reducing the risk of civil disobedience-a response to the 
risk of personal injuries associated with self-help dispossession-to the 
44 Historians have traced its development from Roman rather than Germanic Law. Scc S.S. 
Peloubet, A Collection of Legal Maims in Law and Equity, with English Translations (Littlcton, 
Colo.: F.B. Rothman, 1985) at 225; Sir F. Pollock & F.W. Maitland, Z7te Hislory of English Latv: 
Before the Eme of Edward I, vol. 2,2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) at 29. In 
i%e Corporation of Engston-upon-Hull v. Homer, [I7741 Lofft. 592,98 E.R. 807 at 815 (KB.), Lord 
Mansfield CJ. said, "Possession is very strong; rather more than nine points of the law." Hc used 
the expression in a case concerning prescriptive rights where, in the absence of evidence of a crown 
grant, one was presumed to exist, thus supporting a possessory title. By 1881 in Beddal v. Maiflattd 
(1881), 17 Ch.D. 174 at 183 (H.C.), Sir Edward Fry was noting that the old saying that possession is 
nine points of the law was created by a forcible entry statute, which resulted in a man in possession 
being able to use force to keep out a trespasser. If a trespasser had gained possession, however, the 
rightful owner could not use force to put him out, but had to appeal to the law for assistance. As 
late as 1946, Wtarfon's Law Laicon was expressing the idea as possession constituting "nine points" 
of the law: A.S. Oppe, ed., Wtarfon's Law Laicon, 13th ed. (London: Stevens, 1938) at 666. N.C. 
Black, ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1990) at 1164, 
currently uses the phrase: "Possession is nine-tenths of the law." 
45 Pollock & Maitland, ibid. at 29. See also F. Pollock & R.S. Wright, An Essay on Possessiotr 
in the Comn~on Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888) at 1. 
46 Both with R.S. Wright (see Pollock & Wright, ibid.) and with F.W. Maitland (sec Pollock & 
Maitland, ibid.). 
47 Pollock & Maitland, ibid. at 44. Pollock and Maitland make the point that "so far as 
concerns our own English law we make no doubt that at differcnt times and in diffcrent measures 
every conceivable reason for protecting possession has been felt as a weighty argument and has had 
its influence on rights and remedies." Zbid. 
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protection of ownership interests. But once again, we find references to 
the natural expectation that a person should and will be allowed to keep 
what he or she possesses until someone has proved a better title.@ 
A. Adverse possession 
The rule of adverse possession provides a means by which the 
user of property can successfully assert a claim of ownership over a prior 
owner. Many of the cases involve mistakes on the location of 
boundaries.50 Others, however, reward those who make effective use of 
an asset over an owner who has effectively abandoned it.S1 
The advantages in efficiency of awarding titles to adverse 
possessors usually include the reduction of administrative costs of 
establishing rightful ownership and the encouragement to make 
productive use of assets that are left unused by their owners.52 Posner 
suggests a further advantage in efficiency of the rule of adverse 
possession turning on possible differences between the valuations of 
owners and possessors because of differences in the marginal value of 
their wealth levels: 
The adverse possessor would experience the deprivation of property as a diminution in 
his wealth; the original owner would experience the restoration of the property as an 
increase in his wealth. If they have the same wealth, then probably their combined utility 
will be greater if the adverse possessor is allowed to keep the property.53 
Posner chooses to interpret Holmes's viewsS4 of the disparity between 
feelings of gains and losses as "a point about diminishing marginal utility 
50 Distinctions in granting variances are commonly made between not requiring destruction of 
an improvement built too close to a neighbour by mistake and proposing to do so, and between 
wilfully ignoring a zoning ordinance and doing so by mistake. 
51 While now largely matters of statute in most jurisdictions, the rules grew out of resolutions 
favouring current users because of the difficulty of establishing old entitlements due to lost records 
and fading memories. See R. Cooter & T. Ulen, Law and Economics (Glenview, 111.: Scott, 
Foresn~an & Company, 1988). 
52 See ibid.; W.Z. Hirsch, Law and Econonzics: An Introductoly Analysis (New York: 
Academic Press, 1979). 
53 R. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of Law, 3d ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1986) at 70. 
54 See Holmes, supra note 39. 
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of income."55 The evidence discussed earlier suggests instead that 
Holmes's notion is a prescient articulation of the endowment effect, that 
is, the disparity between the valuation of gains and losses. The reference 
positions are probably such that taking away from a current user would 
likely be valued as a loss, and giving back to the original owner would 
likely be valued as a gain. And given the greater valuations of losses 
over gains, the rule seems consistent with maximizing joint welfare, quite 
apart from any concern with the diminishing marginal utility of income 
or any incentives to encourage investment and use. 
The potential gains depend on how well the limitations and 
restrictions on length of time and behaviour needed to acquire title 
reflect reference positions of the parties and their consequent views of 
. gains and losses. If a person makes very temporary use of a parcel of 
land while the owner is absent for a short time, the reference position is 
unlikely to shift, and an award of title would then be taken as a gain. If 
the use continues over many years, a reasonable expectation of 
continued use would probably develop so that any unexpected 
termination would be viewed as a more important loss. An owner 
deprived of title after a short absence would surely take this as a loss, 
and the discovery that ownership extended several metres beyond an old 
boundary fence would likely be regarded as a less valued gain. 
The rules of adverse possession may be consistent with lowering 
administrative costs and encouraging use. Neither addresses, however, 
the disparate valuations-and consequent efficiency outcomes-that 
depend on perceptions of gains and losses, and the specification of 
requirements in terms of reference positions. A short limitation period 
might well induce use of unused property. If such a specification leaves 
the original owner in the domain of losses and the possessor feeling that 
the title is a gain, the result is likely to be an inefficient change in which 
the gain is outweighed by the loss. 
55 Supra note 53. This was previously observed by R.C. Ellickson, "Bringing Culture and 
Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics" (1989) 65 Chicago- 
Kent L. Rev. 23 at 38. 
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B. Limitations on Recovey of Lost ProFfs 
A second, more specific example of the operation of the 
valuation disparity on judicial decisions is the reluctance of judges to 
compensate for lost profis, whether the claim is framed in contract or 
tort. As Adam Smith wrote: "[Wle naturally depend more on what we 
possess than what is in the hands of others. A man robbed of five 
pounds thinks himself much more injured than if he had lost five pounds 
by a contract."s6 When permitting the recovery of economic losses in 
tort law, this idea is reflected in the consistent distinction that judges 
draw between loss by way of expenditure and failure to make gain." 
While recovery of expenditures is sometimes permitted, recovery of 
foregone gains is not .s8 Several recent decisions have explicitly 
recognized the distinction. In one, Dominion Tape of Canada Ltd. v. 
L.R. McDonald & Sons Ltd29 several bales fell from a trailer and hit a 
hydro pole, cutting power to the plaintiffs plant. The plaintiff 
successfully sued to recover wages paid to employees, which represented 
positive outlays; but could not recover loss of profits, which were only 
negative losses, consisting of a "mere deprivation of an opportunity to 
~ectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and A m ,  ed. by E. Cannan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1896) at 131. 
57 Thus in R.W.M. Dias, ed., Clerk & Lindsell on Torfs, 15th ed. (Agincourt, Ont.: Carswell, 
1982) at 32-33 and at 371-385, the authors typically offer the formal statement that recovery has 
been extended to economic losses representing expenditures, but "the general rule is that loss of 
profitper se is not actionable: there is a no duty-situation." Similarly, in Weller & Co. v. Foot and 
Mouth Disease Research Insfitule (1965), 11966) 1 Q.B. 569, [I9651 3 All ER. 560, the Court held 
that the loss of profit did not constitute a harm of a sort that the law would remedy, and that the 
rule against recovery is independent both of negligence and foreseeability. 
58 The House of Lords' decision in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi (1982), 119831 1 A.C. 520, 
[I9821 3 1V.L.R. 477 [hereinafter Junior Books], which might have presented a radical development 
in compensation law and which permitted recovey of lost profits in a non-contractual setting, has 
not been widely followed. See J.F. Clerk, Fifth ~umulative~~upplement to the Fifteenth ~ d i t i o i ,  ed. 
by R.W.M. Dias (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) at paras. 10-14, which describes six limiting 
factors on the Junior Books decision. 
59 [I9711 3 O.R. 627, 21 D.L.R. (3d) 299 (Co. Ct.). See also MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. 
Foundation Co. of Canada Lld. (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 294, [I9771 2 W.W.R. 717 (B.C.S.C.) 
(employer may be permitted to recover actual wages paid to employees); and Ontario (A.G.) v. 
Cromplon (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 659,74 D.L.R. (3d) 345 (H.CJ.) (specific expenditure incurred in 
putting out fire recoverable). 
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earn an income." The latter, while foreseeable, was judged as too 
remotePo 
While lost profits are said to be recoverable in contract law, it is 
difficult to defend the proposition that the expectation interest of a non- 
breaching party is recognized in contract actions in the same fashion as 
are actual losses.61 As Atiyah argued, the costs of depriving a breaching 
party of his or her wealth are considered by most to outweigh the 
expected benefit to the non breaching party: "[Ilt might well be thought 
by most people that the inconvenience to the promisor of being held to 
his contract would be enough to outweigh the prima facie desirability of 
not disappointing the promisee."62 Fuller and Perdue in their seminal 
article, "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,"63 argued that the 
public interest in redressing wrongs varies directly with the type of claim 
that thk complainant makes. In their eyes, it is relatively easy to justify 
claims to compensation where the plaintiff is seeking return of wealth 
transferred to the defendant, and almost as easy to justify claims to 
compensation for actual out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of 
the breach of contract. However, while contract law protects 
expectations of gain: "[Iln passing from compensation for change of 
position to compensation for loss of expectancy ... [tlhe law no longer 
seeks ... to heal a disturbedstatus quo, but ... assumes a more active role. 
With the transition, the justification for legal relief loses its self-evident 
60 This approach received some support from Wilson J.A. as an innovative approach in 
Ontario (A.G.) v. Fafehi (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 129 at 140,127 D.L.R. (3d) 603 at 615 (C.A.), rev'd 
[I9841 2 S.C.R. 536,15 D.L.R. (4th) 132. 
61 Thus Hugh Collins writes that "[iln practice ... the courts rarely countenance the ... head of 
damages for anticipated profits." H. Collins, The Law of Contract (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1986) at 181-82. See also L.E. Wolcher, "The Accommodation of Regret in Contract 
Remedies" (1988) 73 Iowa L. Rev. 797 at 873. 
The most vocal proponent of the thesis that contract liability is based on reliance and 
restoration of benefits, and thus that contract recovery should be similarly defined, is Patrick 
Atiyah, who has made this point on several occasions. See P.S. Atiyah, llle Rise and Fall of Freedonr 
of Confract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) at 763-779. See also P.S. Atiyah, "Contracts, Promises 
and the Law of Obligations" (1978) 94 L.Q. Rev. 193. 
62 "Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations," ibid. at 216. Professor Scott has more 
pointedly written of the intuition that "a loss of $100.00 is more unpleasant than a gain of $100.00 is 
attractive." R.E. Scott, "Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on tho 
Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices" (1986) 59 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 329 at 335. 
63 (1936) 46 Yale LJ. 52 at 53-57. 
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quality."64 Fuller and Perdue justify the protection of economic 
expectations by explaining that the promisee's assets are actually reduced 
but only in the sense that this would be understood "according to the 
modes of thought which enter into our economic system."65 Moreover, 
they explain that the reason for the protection of expectations is that the 
adoption of a rule, which protects foregone opportunities is, in effect, 
the most effective means of encouraging reliance and thus compensating 
for actual incurred losses! 
In recent years, several judges have reinterpreted the application 
of remoteness limitations on contract damage recovery. Remoteness 
concepts are employed to place limits on damage awards by requiring 
that the risk of loss be foreseeable with some degree of probability at the 
time of ~ontract ing.~~ The doctrinal rules support the view that the 
limiting concepts are not the same in tort as in contract, and that tort 
law-employed to compensate for actual losses rather than forgone 
gain~-~~imposes a much wider liability."67 
The valuation disparity has been explicitly recognized in H. 
Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co.,68 where the Court 
considered the recoverability of losses associated with the sale and 
installation of a defective feed hopper. Lord Denning reinterpreted 
earlier remoteness cases as establishing two distinct rules, which could 
be understood as applying not to the doctrinal categories of tort and 
contract, but rather to the kinds of losses for which compensation was 
being sought. In the case of physical damage and actual expenses, the 
injured party should be able to recover losses which are foreseeable as 
resulting from a breach of contract even if, at the time of contract, there 
64 fiid. at 56-57 [emphasis added]. 
65 fiid. 
66 The common law rules defining remoteness concepts in contract and tort are expressed in 
Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (1967), [I9691 1 A.C. 350, [I9671 3 W.L.R. 1491, [I9671 3 All E.R. 686 
(H.L.), and Oveneas Tankship (UK) L d  v. The Miller Steanzship Company (1966), [I9671 1 A.C. 
617,3 W.L.R. 498 [I9661 2 All E.R. 709 (P.C.) [hereinafter The Wagon Mound No. 21, respectively. 
In the former case, all of the judges attempted to delineate the particular degree of probability with 
which the parties ought to have foreseen the risk of loss resulting from the breach of contract. The 
Wagon Mound No. 2 served similar purposes in the law of torts-the issue being whether the 
defendant ought to be liable for all reasonably foreseeable risks regardless of their degree of 
probability or whether some threshold statistical level of probability would trigger liability. 
6 7 ~ o r d  Reid in l71e Wagon Mound No. 2, ibid at 634. 
68 (1977), [I9781 Q.B. 791, [I9771 3 1V.L.R. 990, [I9781 1 All E.R. 525 (C.A.). 
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was only an extremely small probability of the loss occurring. However, 
claims representing loss of profit or loss of opportunities for gain are 
recoverable only if the risk of loss was contemplated as a serious 
possibility or a real dangerP9 The obvious result, whether or not one 
supports Lord Denning's re-articulation of the traditional remoteness 
mles,70 is that the likelihood of recovery of losses is far greater than the 
likelihood of recovery of unrealized gains. 
The principle reflected in this decision-that physical injuries 
and property damage should be given greater legal protection than 
' unrealized expected economic gains-is again consistent with the 
empirical observation that people value losses more than foregone gains. 
C. Contract Modijkations 
A third area where the valuation disparity manifests itself is in 
the distinctive treatment of performed and unperformed intra- 
contractual promises. For example, where a person promises to pay an 
additional amount of money for a previously arranged contractual 
performance,71 the courts have uniformly denied the promisee the right 
to enforce the promise.72 Thus, if a construction company agrees to pay 
69 This idea was articulated by H.L.A. Hart &A.M. Honore in Causation in l l~e  Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1959) at 281-87. It is also explicitly recognized in some Civilian jurisdictions. For 
example, the German Civil Code limits contract recovery in certain cases to the "negative" or 
reliance interest, as discussed in G.E. Clos, Comparative Law (Littleton, Colo.: Fred B. Rothman & 
Co., 1979) at 226-236. Furthermore, article 252 explicitly limits recovery of losses of particular gains 
to situations where the risk is foreseeable as a probable consequence of the breach. See Germany, 
The G e m n  Civil Code, trans. by I.S. Forrester, S.L. Goren & H.-M. Ilgen (South Hackensack, NJ.: 
Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1975). 
70 The judgment is important because he confesses that the physical injurylproperty damage 
versus economic loss distinction operates de facfo whatever formal test one accepts. See supra note 
68 at 533 where he emphasizes a particular set of product liability cases in which personal injury 
claims were compensated "even though [manufacturers and retailers] had not the faintest suspicion 
of any trouble." 
71 The same anomaly operates where a creditor promises to accept less than the full amount 
owing from a debtor. At common law, the creditor could retract the promise even where the debtor 
had paid the money. See Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L.). However, the Mercantile 
Law Amendment Act, R.S.O. 1980, e. 265, s. 16, provides thatparlperformance of the promise will 
extinguish the obligation. Again, the distinction is simply where the money is located. 
72 See Gilbert SteelLtd. v. ~ n i v e t s i ~  Construction Ltd. (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 19,67 D.L.R. (3d) 
606 (C.A.). 
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an additional $20,000 to ensure delive~y of steel, which has already been 
contracted for, the court will not enforce the promise to pay the 
additional sum. However, if the construction company agrees to pay the 
additional $20,000 and actually transfers the money to the steel supplier, 
the promise is presumptively enforceable. The court will not order the 
money to be returned unless the constructioil company can demonstrate 
that the money was extorted from it under conditions of economic 
duress." 
The situations are indistinguishable except, again, for the 
location of the money. In the first example, the court will not order the 
transfer of wealth from the promisor to the promisee, preferring the 
status quo. In the second example, the court will not order the return of 
the wealth from the promisee to the promisor, again preferring the status 
quo. There are very persuasive reasons for singling out these intra- 
contractual promises for special treatment. They represent very real 
risks of extortion generated by reliance-based situational monopolies; 
they introduce uncertainty relating to the authority to make the alleged 
modification of the agreement; and they generate additional transaction 
costs to contractual dispute resolution. But those reasons apply with 
equal force to performed and unperformed promises. The distinction 
developed in the cases is, once more, consistent with the empirical data, 
which point to significant welfare losses in the case of coerced transfers 
of wealth. 
D. Gratuitous Promises 
Judges have traditionally and consistently drawn a distinction 
behveen giving a gift to someone and promising to do so.74 Performed 
73 See R. Goff & G. Jones, The Low of Resiitution, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1978). 
See Peter Eewef Sons' Co. of Canada v. Eakins Consfruction Ltd,  [I9601 S.C.R. 361,22 D.L.R. (2d) 
465; Re hfunicipal Spraying & Contracting Ltd. (1980) 15 B.L.R. 37, (sub nom. Municipal Spraying 
and Contracting Lid. v. Nfld.) 153 A.P.R. 91 (Nfld. T.D.) (plaintiff entitled to recover $195,000 
worth of additional work performed for defendant on ground that performance was rendered in 
response to threatened legal action and was not voluntary). 
74 See M.A. Eisenberg, "The Principles of Consideration" (1982) 67 Cornell L. Rev. 640; M.A. 
Eisenberg, "Donative Promises" (1979) 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1; and Hakbury's Laws of England, 4th 
ed., vol. 20 (London: Buttenvorths, 1978) para. 62 at 36: "where a gift rests merely in promise, 
whether written or verbal ... it is incomplete ... and the court will not compel the intending ... to 
complete and perfect it." 
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gifts are enforceable; unperformed promises to give gifts are not. The 
undelivered gift cases are consistent with contract doctrines; the courts 
have not looked kindly on gratuitous promises75 either at common law 
or at equity, and normally the rule is that they are not enforceable.76 
The major exception to the bargain theory of consideration is the 
enforcement of promises that have generated reasonable, detrimental 
re1iance.n 
Eisenberg classifies donative promises into three groups: 
informal and not relied-upon, formal but not relied-upon, and relied- 
upon.78 Judges have consistently refused to enforce those gift promises 
that fall into the first and second categories. Several underlying 
rationales for the non-enforcement have been examined by several 
authors and various explanations have been offered. For example,' 
Posner argues that the rule perhaps reflects an empirical hunch that 
"gratuitous promises tend to ... [involve] small stakes"79 and, therefore, 
that the social costs of enforcing the promise will generally exceed the 
utility of doing so. Swan and Reiter suggest that we are naturally 
suspicious of gift promises. Because the law has provided rules for the 
completion of legally enforceable gifts, we should ask ourselves why 
those rules were not followed and whether, in fact, the donor really 
intended to complete the gift.80 
75 Gratuitous or donative promises are those given without the exchange of something of 
value, whether it be tangible property or another promise. Cum0e v. Mesa (1875), L.R. 10 Ex. 153, 
23 W.R. 450; Spruce Grove v. Yellowhead Regional Library Board (1982), 44 A.R. 48,143 D.L.R. (3d) 
188,21 M.P.L.R. 62 (Ck). 
76 See for example, A.G. Guest, Amon's Law of Confract, 26th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984) at 82. 
7 7 ~ . ~ .  Posner, "Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law" (1977) 6 J. Leg. Stud. 411; and 
C Fried, Confract as Promise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) at 56. 
78 "Donative Promises,"supra note 74 at 6-11. 
79 Posner, supra note 77 at 417. Posner argues that "~]romises should not be enforced where 
the enforcement cost-to the extent not borne by the promisor-exceeds the gains from 
enforcement," and where the only reason for enforcement would be an increase in net social 
welfare. Bid. at 414. It would, as Posner puts it at 417, be uneconomical to enforce casual social 
promises where the increment in utility to the promisor would be small if the promise wcrc 
enforceable and the legal error costs high. 
80 J. Swan & B.J. Reiter, Contracts, Cases, Notes and Materials, 3d ed. (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 1985) at 223; and M.D. Bayles, "Legally Enforceable Commitments" (1985) 4 L. & 
Phi. 312 at 338. 
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An alternative explanation points to the small welfare loss 
associated with not receiving a gift, which is measured by the donee's 
foregone gain of the opportunity, relative to the welfare loss associated 
with depriving an existing owner of property of an entitlement, which is 
measured by the owner's asking price to give it up. This explanation, 
unlike the others, is consistent with the empirical data described earlier. 
Thus, Eisenberg argues that "lost expectation-a special form of 
disappointment-is among the least intense of injuries" and, therefore, 
is not worthy of legal remedy.81 Since "lost expectation" is a foregone 
gain, Eisenberg clearly reveals an intuitive awareness of the valuation 
disparity and its role in understanding and predicting judicial choice. An 
unperformed gift promise is not treated as a loss. The "wrench of 
delivery"82 has not been experienced by the promisor and no real loss 
has been experienced by the promisee. 
A more realistic assessment of gains and losses, taking the 
valuation disparity into account, would predict that gratuitous promises 
that are relied upon will often be enforced because in those cases a real 
loss would have been incurred.83 In Skidmore v. Bradford,84 a nephew 
was promised a gift of a warehouse by his uncle who, in addition to 
paying one thousand pounds towards the purchase price of five thousand 
pounds, had asked the owner to amend the agreement by writing in the 
nephew's name and by preparing the receipt in the nephew's name. 
Before he died, the uncle paid a further five hundred pounds on the 
purchase price. Since the nephew had signed the agreement to 
purchase, he was held liable for it. He paid, sued the uncle's estate to 
enforce the promise to give the warehouse as a gift, and won. There the 
Court held that the nephew had "incurred that liability on the faith of 
the representations of the testator that he would give him the .  
warehouse."85 
"Donative Promises," supra note 74 at 3. See also "The Principles of Consideration," supra 
note 74 at 656 where he says that "[tlhis principle can be justified on several grounds, the most 
important of which is the low level of injuly resulting from breach." 
82 P. Mecham, "The Requirement of Delively in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action 
Evidenced by Commercial Instruments" (1926) 21 Ill. L. Rev. 341 at 348-49. 
83 This is, in effect, the argument presented by P. Atiyah, Consideration in C&ztracts.- A 
Fundan~ental Resfatenlent (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971). 
84 (1869), LR.  8 Eq. 134. 
85 Ibid. at 137. 
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Article 90(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contractss6 
represents the modern version of this position. I t  provides that 
promises, which can reasonably be expected to induce reliance, are 
binding and should be enforced through remedies "limited as justice 
requires." While the cases discussing the appropriate remedy under 
Article 90 are not uniform, a substantial percentage of them award 
remedies limited by the promisee's reliance losses rather than expected 
benefits.87 
E. Opportunistic Conduct 
Opportunistic conduct during contract formation and 
performance may take several forms, including withholding information 
during contract formation, taking advantage of ambiguities in language, 
demanding performance in unintended situations, and failing to perform 
in order to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. Yet contract 
negotiations and performance will likely take place more effectively if 
trust is present and is generated by the process.88 Risks of opportunism 
can be reduced by questioning the other's motives, honesty, and future 
plans? but it is inappropriate and probably dysfunctional to do so. 
-- - -  
a' ~s fa tement  (Second) of Contracts 1 90 (1981). 
87 see  supra note 63 at 64-65. See for example, Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 
1948); and ~siociated Tabulating Services v. Olynbic Life Insurance Co., 414 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 
1969). 
88 See R. McKean, "Economics of Trust, Altruism, and Corporate Responsibility" in E.S. 
Phelps, ed., Altruism, Moralify and Economic Z7leory (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975) 
29; D. Collard, Altruism and Econonzy: A Study in Non-Selfish Economics (Oxford: Martin 
Robertson, 1978) at 12; and I.R. Macneil, Z71e New Social Contract (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1980). 
By trust we mean attitudes and behaviour, which indicate that each person is willing to rely on 
the other to act fairly and to take into account the other's welfare. Ian Macneil suggests that he uses 
solidarity and trust as equivalents, referring to a belief in future harmonious affirmative 
cooperation. See I.R. Macneil, "Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity" 
(1986) 96 Ethics 567 at 572. 
89 For an example of opportunistic behaviour in long-term supply contracts, see Frafelli 
Gardino S.pA. v. Caribbean Lumber Co., 587 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1979). (The seller claims that it is 
unable to meet contract commitments due to insufficient shipping facilities. The Court finds that 
facilities were available, but that the seller had chosen to use them for more profitable 
engagements.) 
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The treatment by the courts of one form of opportunistic 
behaviour-deliberate contract breaches motivated by attempts to 
capture unanticipated profitable opportunities-represents another 
example of the incorporation of the valuation disparity concept into 
judicial decision making. Here the valuation disparity manifests itself in 
fairness norms, which track those generated by the fairness studies 
discussed earlier. 
One model of contract law, employed by Posner, ignores the 
motives or gains of a person who breaks a contract. Whether the 
contract breaker fails to perform in order to avoid losses or to generate 
windfall gains is irrelevant.90 An alternate model of contract, which 
reflects the gain-loss valuation disparity, holds that motives for breach 
are important, and that failing to perform in order to avoid 
unanticipated expenses will be treated differently from failing to perform 
in order to generate a windfall gain to the breaching party.91 Kessler, 
Gilmore, and Kronman describe the "implicitly amoral"92 contract 
theory of Posner and Holmes, which ignores the motives for breach. 
Alternatively, they argue that breaches motivated by a gain to the 
contract breakerwill be treated more severely: 
Many will say that [the] breach ought still to be condemned from an ethical point of view 
... The inclination to blame A will be even stronger if he has benefitted from his breach, 
although B has not been harmed ... The Holniesian view ... seems never to have fully 
overcome the resistance of common sense, which stubbornly insists that moral blame 
(unlike legal liability) is not entirely a function of the conse uences of an action but 
depends, as wel1,upon the motives and intentions of the actor. 99 
This second model appears to operate more consistently in 
contract damage disputes.g4 Predictions,95 both as to liability and the 
90 See supra note 53 and supra note 38 at 458-62. See also Butler v. Faircloug1z (1917), 23 
C.LR. 78 at 79; and Asanzera Oil Cop.  v. Sea Oil and General Cop.  (1978), [I9791 1 S.C.R. 633,89 
D.L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom Baud Cop.  N.V. v. Brook no. 2) [I9791 3 W.W.R. 93. 
91 See A.S. Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (London: Buttenvorths, 1987) 
at 252 and at 273. 
92 Contracfs, Cases and Materiak, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986) at 1067. 
93 lbid. 
94 It may operate in many other contexts as well. For example, deliberate breach for profit 
may influence judicial discretion in saying that a breach is fundapental, thus triggering judicial 
review of otherwise enforceable exclusion clauses. Or, wilful breach for profit might influence 
judicial interpretation of terms as conditions rather than warranties. Both choices would work to 
the contract breaker's disadvantage. Perhaps the application of the mistake doctrines can be 
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extent of recovery by plaintiffs, vary directly with information on the 
motives for breach. In addition, the rule that "motives don't count" has 
been subject to a number of decisions in which judges have explicitly 
recognized that they are treating the two situations differently and have 
designed damage awards deliberately to deprive the breaching parties of 
the gains, which motivated their non-performance.g6 
But the treatment of opportunism is more subtle than merely 
awarding damages to deprive contract breakers of windfall gains. It 
extends to the interpretation of facts and the discretionary application of 
principles, which permit judges to incorporate fairness attitudes in their 
decision making. These fairness norms, like those reflected in the 
empirical studies described earlier, are associated with the distinction 
between gains and losses. 
The operation of fairness norms in contract law can be 
demonstrated by contrasting cases in which judges respond differently, 
depending on whether the otherwise similar behaviour of contracting 
parties is motivated by attempts to take advantage of unexpected 
opportunities or by attempts to respond to unanticipated losses. 
One example of such a response might be found in the 
application of promissory estoppel doctrines in contract performance 
and modification. Promissory estoppel was developed by the courts in 
explained by examining the motives of the person who is seeking to enforce agreements against 
others who misinterpreted the word or the agreement. 
95 What is surprising is that many, if not all, academics interpret the cases as supporting this 
view without any data except their intuitions. Thus Kessler, Gilmore and Kronman suggest that, in 
the case of wilful breach, the inclination to blame [the contract breaker] will be even sfronger ifhe has 
benefitedfrorn the breach. Supra note 92 at 1067. 
96 For example, in Penarth Dock Engineering Co. v. Pounds, [I9631 1 Lloyd's Rep. 359 (Q.B.), a 
defendant refused to remove its ship from the plaintiffs dock Even though the plaintiff did not 
suffer any loss, the Court ordered the defendant to pay money to the representing the cost 
of renting the space, which it saved by not having to rent alternate space. 
The cases in which judges have explicitly deprived contract-breakers of the gains generated by 
breach are characterized, as the valuation disparity data would predict, by behaviour that often 
represents deliberate interference with possessory or property rights of the plaintiff. Thus, in 
Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd., [I9741 1 W.L.R. 798, [I9741 2 All E.R. 321 (Ch.), 
the defendants entered into a restrictive covenant with the plaintiff, which prohibited the 
construction of houses on the plaintiffs property. The defendants built several houses, which did 
not diminish the value of the plaintiffs property, but were ordered to pay 5% of the 50,000 pounds 
profit which they made on the construction of the houses. The damages were ordered in lieu of an 
injunction to demolish the houses. The Court referred to several tort decisions, which provided for 
restitutionary awards in the case of interference with the plaintiffs property; the case had becn 
deemed analogous to that situation. Seesupra note 91 at 274-75. 
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an effort to protect the interests of contracting parties who rely on the 
promises for which they did not bargain or representations of their 
contracting parties. It is applied, as most writers admit, to avoid unjust 
enrichment and the opportunistic manipulation of legal rules and 
ambiguous contract language.97 
A recent example of the application of the doctrine, which offers 
insight into these underlying fairness norms, is a recent decision of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal in a dispute between a landlord and a 
tenant regarding the ability of the tenant to exercise an option to renew 
its tenancy.98 The facts were straightforward. Dukes Cookies had 
entered into a three-year contractual tenancy agreement with the Alma 
Mater Society of the University of British Columbia. The lease included 
a term which permitted Dukes to extend the lease for two years if it gave 
written notice to the landlord during a specific two-month period. 
During the term of the lease, Dukes and the Alma Mater Society 
began negotiations for a new five-year lease. The negotiations included 
discussions relating to profit-sharing arrangements and an expansion of 
the leased premises. The negotiations were prolonged until after the 
two-month notice period had ended. Dukes failed to give written notice 
to extend the existing lease because they assumed, based on statements 
made by the Alma Mater Society's principals, that they would obtain a 
new five-year lease. ~ f t e r  the expiry of the two-month notice period, the 
Alma Mater Society notified Dukes that it would terminate the lease 
according to its terms because Dukes had not given written notice to 
extend the original lease. Dukes brought the legal action to prevent the 
Alma Mater Society from enforcing the written notice provision in the 
current lease. 
Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal decided the case in 
favour of Dukes with the result that it was permitted to exercise its 
option notwithstanding the expiration of the notice period. The formal 
justification for the decision was the application of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel. Through this doctrine, judges can protect the 
97 See J.A. Manwaring, "Promissory Estoppel in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1987) 10 
Dalhousie LJ. 43 at 51. The common law doctrine of promissory estoppel is reflected insupra note 
86. See also J.M. Feinman, "Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method" (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 
678. 
Re 6781427 Holdings Ltd. and Alma Muter Society of University of Britbh Columbia (1987), 
44 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (B.C.C.A.), affg (1987), 36 D.L.R. (4th) 753 [hereinafter Dukes]. 
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unbargained for reliance of a party to a contract where it would be 
inequitable to permit the other party to retract a representation that 
induced the reliance.99 However, it is obvious from the decision that the 
Court could just as easily have decided the case in favour of the landlord 
on either of two grounds. First, the Court could have found that no 
representation was made by the landlord to the tenant regarding the 
likelihood of entering into the new arrangement because the testimony 
of both parties was in conflict on this ground. Also, there was 
considerable authority that there must be an unequivocal and explicit 
representation in order to trigger the doctrine. Second, the Court could 
have found that it was unreasonable for the tenant to infer that the 
notice provision would not be enforced even if the representation had 
been made. 
What is missing from both judgments, and yet what must have 
been critical from the perspective of everyone concerned, is any evidence 
explaining the abrupt reversal by the landlord of its negotiation position. 
Why, one can ask, did the landlord negotiate for months as if it would 
enter into an extended new lease, and then, without warning, give the 
tenant notice to vacate the premises? 
That is the first question that comes to the mind of many 
readers, and yet is left unanswered in the reported reasons for the 
decisions. Discussions with the lawyer for the defendant landlord, 
however, reveal a very different picture. The lawyer indicates that the 
trial judge was extremely interested in the motives for the landlord's 
behaviour-an irrelevant consideration in formal terms.100 The motive 
as described in the evidence was simple. The landlord discovered during 
negotiations that the profits generated by the tenant's business far 
exceeded its expectations, and had terminated negotiations in order to 
open its own cookie business in the same location! What is remarkable 
about the case is that neither the trial nor appellate decisions mentions 
this fact. That is, the motive for the termination of the negotiations 
-- - 
99 The American position is not substantially different, although there is considerable debate 
regarding the extent to which the promisor can be taken to be responsible for the promisee's 
reliance. See supra note 86; and Feinman,supra note 97. 
loo That is, the formal doctrine of promissory estoppel, which was applied to justify deciding 
the case in favour of the tenant, does not include an assessment of the motive of the party who 
attempts to retract a representation. 
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consisted of an attempt to obtain unexpected gains at the expense of the 
tenant. 
The case can be interpreted as an example of judges responding 
to the valuation disparity. That is, the unilateral decision by the landlord 
to terminate the lease without giving the tenant the opportunity to renew 
for two years generated an expected gain to the landlord a t  the expense of 
the tenant. The decision can be seen as a reflection of judicial intuition, 
consistent with the empirical data on the valuation disparity, that the 
benefit to the landlord, consisting of expected profit, would be 
substantially less than the harm imposed on the tenant by the eviction. 
This valuation disparity gives rise to strong perceptions of unfairness 
consistent with the empirical evidence indicating that when one person 
gains at the expense of another-a zero-sum game-the transaction is 
overwhelmingly seen as unfair.lol 
A second example of judges responding to the valuation disparity 
and the motive for the defendant's action is a decision on the doctrine of 
commercial impracticability in Aluminum Company of America v. Essex 
Group, Inc.102 That case involved a claim for relief from contractual 
obligations on the doctrinal grounds of mistake, frustration, and 
commercial impracticability by the plaintiff Alcoa. Alcoa successfully 
obtained judicially ordered relief from a long-term obligation to process 
aluminum ore, which had turned out to be unprofitable because of 
unanticipated increases in Alcoa's energy costs. The case is generally 
considered remarkable for two reasons. First, the trial judge was forced 
to distinguish a long line of cases, which most people interpreted as 
precluding relief where the plaintiff3 expected profits had failed to 
materialize due to unanticipated cost increases. Second, the trial judge 
did not simply relieve Alcoa from its smelting obligations, but imposed a 
loss and risk-sharing modification to the contract by developing new 
pricing terms to reduce the losses to Alcoa associated with the explicit 
contract pricing anangement.'O3 
I0l See supra note 37. 
lo2 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) [hereinafter Alcoa]. 
Io3 The literature on the case is voluminous, although most writers focus on issues other than 
the distinction between gain and loss, which we consider in this paper. See V.P. Goldberg, "Price 
Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts" (1985) Wis. L. Rev. 52% R.E. Speidel, "The New Spirit of 
Contract" (1982) 2 J.L. & Corn. 193; and R.E. Speidel, "Court Imposed Price Adjustments under 
Long-Term Supply Contracts" (1981) 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 369. 
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In Alcoa, the Court explicitly recognized fairness norms as 
justifying judicial choices.lo4 The problem, of course, is identifying or 
articulating the content of this fairness norm. Again, as in Dukes, the 
interpretation of judicial behaviour is problematic. But the judgment 
includes a reference to the formally irrelevant fact that, when Essex 
Group had discovered that it was in a position to own substantial 
amounts of very cheap aluminum, it decided to enter the commodities 
market. Instead of ordering and using the aluminum in its commercial 
operations, it had sought out and entered into contracts with third 
parties to sell its aluminum at current market prices and, thus, reap a 
windfall gain at the expense of Alcoa.lo5 
Again, the implication of the judgment is consistent with judicial 
sensitivity to the valuation disparity which generates perceptions of 
unfairness. Essex Group was gaining a windfall profit at the direct 
expense of Alcoa, a transaction consistently seen as unfair. 
One cannot, of course, point to two ambiguous cases and 
conclude that judges are responding to conflict only in terms of fairness 
and the valuation disparity. Certainly there is little explicit recognition 
of their doing so. What is required to verify the connection of law to the 
fairness data, and what is obviously impossible, is to identify two 
populations of cases in which all facts are identical but for the relevant 
variable-the acquisition of an advantage at the direct expense of 
another party. If judges are acting in this way, the outcomes in the two 
groups of cases should be different.106 
lo4 Seesupra note 102 at 76, where the trial judge alludes to the idea that the contract would 
not be enforced where it would be "commercially senseless and unjust." See also "The New Spirit 
of Contract," ibia at 201, referring to the courts' policing transactions "in the interests of fairness"; 
and S.W. Halpem, "Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for thc 
'Wisdom of Solomon' " (1987) 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1123, referring to an obligation to act in good 
faith and to agree to contractual adjustments in order to avoid any fortuitous advantage at the 
expense of the other party. 
lo5 Apparently, Essex Group was taking advantage of its 36.25 cents per pound price for 
aluminum by selling 25 per cent of its supply in the open market at the then current market price of 
73.13 cents per pound. In fact, Essex Group was underbidding Alcoa and, according to Alcoa, 
taking Alcoa's customers. See Note, "Court-Imposed Modifications: Supplementing the All-or- 
Nothing Approach to Discharge Cases" (1983) 44 Ohio St. LJ. 1079 at 1089 n. 107 and n. 108. 
Io6 The obvious and insurmountable problem with conducting the experiment is that the two 
populations of cases do not exist. However, we are not alone in suspecting that deliberate breach 
for profit is influencing the exercise of judicial discretion. For example, Swan and Reiter, in a 
discussion of the dissent of Invin J. in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 
(Okla. 1963), suggest that he is responding to deliberate decisions to break contracts and thus gain 
Heinonline - -  30 Osgoode Hall L. J. 766 1992 
19921 Judicial Choice and Valuation Disparities 767 
F. Repossession 
A final example of judges developing principles consistent with 
, the valuation disparity consists of a series of decisions in which judges 
have restricted creditors' rights to repossess delivered goods on default 
by buyers prior to full payment of the purchase price. This is evident 
first, in the presumptive treatment by judges of time-of-payment clauses, 
where judges have consistently held that "time is not of the essence" in 
regard to payment for goods.lo7 Without an explicit contract term, the 
result is that sellers cannot terminate the contract and repossess goods 
simply on default, and that buyers are given the opportunity to remedy 
the defect and retain possession. 
Second, even where time-of-payment clauses have been expressly 
stated as conditions-thus apparently permitting the seller to elect to be 
discharged from the contract and to repossess the goods-the courts 
have developed several techniques to protect the possessory welfare of 
the buyer. These include liberal doctrines of waiverlog and restrictions 
on the self-help repossession tactics of sellers.IO9 
Third, a significant number of jurisdictions have enacted seize-or- 
sue legislation, which precludes sellers from both repossessing goods and 
suing for the purchase price>1° Finally, in many jurisdictions, 
repossession is permitted only with permission of the court where the 
wealth at the expense of another. See Contracts, Cases, Notes and Maferiak, supra note 80 at 10. 
lo7 M.G. Bridge, Sale of Goods (Toronto: Buttenvorths, 1988) at 409. See also Mersey Steel 
and Iron Co. v. Naylor Benzon and Co. (1884), 9 App. Cas. 434, [1881-851 All E.R. 365; and Decro- 
Wall It~ternational S.A. v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd., [I9711 1 W.L.R. 361, [I9711 2 All E.R. 216 
(CA-). 
log See Pantoulsos v. Raymond Hadley C o p  of New York, [I9171 2 KB. 473, [1916-171 All 
E.R. Rep. 448 (the failure to object to late payment held to constitute waiver of the right to treat 
timely payment as a condition). 
lo9 For example, sellers must give buyers notice of their intention to repossess or take control 
of property. See Traders Bank of Canada v. G. & 1 Brown Manufacturing Co. (1889), 18 O.R. 430 
(Ch.); and Royal Bank of Canada v. Cal Glass Ltd. (1980), 22 B.C.L.R. 328 (C.A). The restrictions 
are described in detail in D. Paciocco, "Personal Property Security Act Repossession: The Risk and 
the Remedy" in M.A. Springman & E. Gertner, eds., Debtor-Creditor Law: Practice and Doctrine 
(Toronto: Buttenvorths, 1985) at 365. Recent statutory developments have removed the notice 
requirement. See for example, Z71e Personal Property SecuriryAct, C.C.S.M. c. P35, s. 57. 
'lo See Uniform Commercial Code 8 5.103; The Limitation of Civil Rights Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 
103, s. 18; Sale of Goods on Condition Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 373, s. 20; and Chattel Mortgage Act., 
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 48, s. 23. 
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buyer has paid more than two-thirds of the purchase price.lll This array 
of judicial and legislative activity can be explained by the data on the 
valuation disparity, which would predict substantial welfare losses 
associated with repossession of goods from debtors on default. 
Schwartz has attacked seize-or-sue legislation as being "without 
coherent justification."ll2 He argues, first, that there is no evidence of 
systematic underselling of repossessed goods through organized cartels; 
and second, that repossession does not impose greater harms on debtors 
than it creates gains for creditors. Schwartz does discuss the valuation 
disparity, but unfortunately, he misses its significance in several ways. 
First, in discussing the effects of repossession, he admits that the losses 
associated with repossession may reflect the fact that debtors may value 
the goods more than the market price. However, he then states that the 
"harms could not occur if debtors were perfectly informed of the 
consequences of granting ~ecuri ty."~~j That is, if the future welfare loss 
were known at the time of contracting, then the debtor would either not 
grant security, or would grant less and pay a higher interest rate. 
Whether Schwartz is correct or not depends on when the buyer's 
reference point changes, and thus when the repossession is perceived as 
a loss rather than a foregone gain. If, as seems reasonable, the shift does 
not take place until some time after possession of the good, then the 
buyer's ability to contract ex ante is compromised. 
Second, even assuming debtor ignorance of the costs of 
repossession, Schwartz argues that the alleged welfare losses associated 
with repossession either would not occur or would be trivial. He 
acknowledges that, if debtors value the goods because they own them 
and thus,'if the amount they would demand to give up their goods 
exceeds the amount they would pay to obtain the goods in a significant 
way, then the assignment of legal rights could determine outcomes more 
frequently than is commonly supposed. However, the valuation disparity 
may be linked to a kind of relationship connected not to the assignment 
of legal rights, but to possession. If that is so, then merely shifting 
ownership will not eliminate the valuation disparity. 
See for example, ConsurnerProlection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 87, s. U(1). 
A. Schwartz, "The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods" (1983) 26 J. L. 
Econ. 117 at 161. 
113 lbid. at 140. 
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Third, in assessing whether repossession generates losses, he 
denies the empirical validity of claims that "creditors necessarily derive 
less value from repossessed goods than debtors lose."lZ4 While the 
empirical studies described above do not support the proposition that 
the creditors necessarily derive less value, they certainly do offer support 
for the proposition that the loss to the debtor will consistently, and in a 
very significant way, exceed the expected gain to the creditor. 
Finally, Schwartz argues that the gain to the buyer who 
purchases repossessed goods from the creditor may offset the loss to the 
original buyer, and thus that repossession does not necessarily destroy 
value. Again, the empirical studies discussed earlier suggest that the loss 
of economic welfare measured by the original buyer's reservation price 
will almost certainly exceed the gain of the second buyer. 
Our conclusion, drawn from the empirical evidence described 
above, is that buyers in possession will consistently value the possessed 
goods significantly above the value placed on them either by 
repossessing creditors or hypothetical future buyers, and the purchaser 
will not generally be able to take the higher valuation into account when 
contracting. Recognizing this valuation disparity offers considerable 
'support for the judicial restrictions on repossession framed in common 
law rules and presumptive interpretations of contract language, as well 
as for the legislative restrictions on repossession adopted in many 
jurisdictions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the assertions of conventional economic practice and 
the prescriptions of many critics of legal outcomes, people commonly do 
not value losses the same as they value gains. The greater weight given 
to losses over objectively commensurate gains appears pervasive and is a 
major determinant of which actions or changes meet 'community 
standards of being fair or acceptable and which are likely to be 
considered unfair or less acceptable. 
Further, legal institutions appear to reflect the same disparity 
between valuations. Court decisions over a very broad array of cases 
IZ4 lbid. at 142-43. 
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seem to take account of these differences in according greater protection 
of losses over foregone gains. 
This greater weight given to losses in legal outcomes is not only 
consistent with people's judgments of fairness and normal business 
practices but, to the extent that these different weights reflect actual 
valuations of welfare changes, this differential treatment in judicial 
choices may also promote efficiency. Equivalent treatment of gains and 
losses called for by reform proposals "to reconcile" the differencesns 
seems not only unlikely to be adopted, but may also lead to inefficient 
outcomes and may be contrary to community fairness and equity 
standards. 
IIS Waddams, supra note 7 at 540. 
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